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Abstract
Graph deep learning models, such as graph convo-
lutional networks (GCN) achieve remarkable per-
formance for tasks on graph data. Similar to other
types of deep models, graph deep learning mod-
els often suffer from adversarial attacks. However,
compared with non-graph data, the discrete fea-
tures, graph connections and different definitions
of imperceptible perturbations bring unique chal-
lenges and opportunities for the adversarial attacks
and defenses for graph data. In this paper, we pro-
pose both attack and defense techniques. For at-
tack, we show that the discreteness problem could
easily be resolved by introducing integrated gradi-
ents which could accurately reflect the effect of per-
turbing certain features or edges while still benefit-
ing from the parallel computations. For defense, we
observe that the adversarially manipulated graph
for the targeted attack differs from normal graphs
statistically. Based on this observation, we propose
a defense approach which inspects the graph and
recovers the potential adversarial perturbation. Our
experiments on a number of datasets show the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed methods.
1 Introduction
Graph is commonly used to model many real-world rela-
tionships, such as social networks [Newman et al., 2002],
citation networks and transactions [Ron and Shamir, 2013]
and the control-flow of programs [Allen, 1970]. The recent
advance [Kipf and Welling, 2017; Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2018;
Cao et al., 2016; Henaff et al., 2015] in deep learning ex-
pands its applications on graph data. One common task on
graph data is node classification: for a graph and labels of a
portion of nodes, the goal is to predict the labels for the unla-
belled nodes. This can be used to classify the unknown roles
in the graph. For example, topics of papers in the citation
network, customer types in the recommendation systems.
Compared with the classic methods [Bhagat et al., 2011;
Xu et al., 2013], deep learning starts to push forward the per-
formance of node classification tasks. The graph convolu-
tional networks [Bruna et al., 2013; Edwards and Xie, 2016]
and its recent variants [Kipf and Welling, 2017] perform con-
volution operations in the graph domain by aggregating and
combining the information of neighbor nodes. In these works,
both node features and the graph structures (i.e., edges) are
considered for classifying nodes.
Deep learning methods are often criticized for their lack
of robustness [Goodfellow et al., 2015]. In other words, it is
not difficult to craft adversarial examples by only perturbing
a tiny portion of examples to fool the deep neural networks to
give incorrect predictions. Graph convolutional networks are
no exception. These vulnerabilities under adversarial attacks
are major obstacles for deep learning applications to be used
in the safety-critical scenarios. In graph neural networks, one
node can be a user in the social network or an e-commerce
website. A malicious user may manipulate his profile or con-
nect to targeted users on purpose to mislead the analytics sys-
tem. Similarly, adding fake comments to specific products
can fool the recommender systems of a website.
The key challenge for simply adopting existing adversar-
ial attack techniques used in non-graph data on graph con-
volutional networks is the discrete input problems. Specifi-
cally, the features of the graph nodes are often discrete. The
edges, especially those in unweighted graphs, are also dis-
crete. To address this, some recent studies have proposed
greedy methods [Wang et al., 2018; Zu¨gner et al., 2018]
to attack the graph-based deep learning systems. A greedy
method to perturb either features or graph structure itera-
tively. Graph structure and features statistics are preserved
during the greedy attack. In this paper, we show that al-
though having the discrete input issue, the gradients can still
be approximated accurately by integrated gradients. Inte-
grated gradients approximate Shapley values [Hart, 1989;
Lundberg and Lee, 2016] by integrating partial gradients with
respect to input features from reference input to the actual in-
put. Integrated gradients greatly improve the efficiency of the
node and edge selection in comparison to iterative methods.
Compared with explorations in attacks, the defense of ad-
versarial examples in graph models is not well-studied. In
this paper, we show that one key reason for the vulnerabili-
ties of graph models, such as GCN, is that these models are
essentially aggregating the features according to graph struc-
tures. They heavily rely on the nearest neighboring informa-
tion while making predictions on target nodes. We looked
into the perturbations made by the existing attack techniques
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and found that adding edges which connect to nodes with dif-
ferent features plays the key role in all of the attack methods.
In this paper, we show that simply performing pre-processing
to the adjacency matrix of the graph is able to identify the
manipulated edges. For nodes with bag-of-words (BOW)
features, the Jaccard index is effective while measuring the
similarities between connected nodes. By removing edges
that connect very dissimilar nodes, we are able to defend the
targeted adversarial attacks without decreasing the accuracy
of the GCN models. Our results on a number of real-world
datasets show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
attack and defense.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Graph Convolutional Network
Given an attributed graph G = (A,X ), A ∈ [0, 1]N×N
is the adjacency matrix and X ∈ [0, 1]D represents the
D-dimenisonal binary node features. Assuming the in-
dices for nodes and features are V = {1, 2, ..., N} and
F = {1, 2, ..., D}, respectively. We then consider the
task of semi-supervised node classification where a subset
of nodes VL ⊆ V are labelled with labels from classes C =
{1, 2, ..., cK}. The target of the task is to map each node in
the graph to a class label. This is often called transductive
learning given the fact that the test nodes are already known
during the training time.
In this work, we study Graph Convolutional Network
(GCN) [Kipf and Welling, 2017], a well-established method
for semi-supervised node classifications. For GCN, initially,
H0 = X . The GCN model then follows the following rule to
aggregate the neighboring features:
H(l+1) = σ(D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2H(l)W (l)) (1)
where A˜ = A + IN is the adjacency matrix of the graph
G with self connections added, Dˆ is a diagonal matrix with
D˜i,i = ΣjA˜ij , and σ is the activation function to introduce
non-linearity. Each of the above equation corresponds to one
graph convolution layer. A fully connected layer with soft-
max loss is usually used after L layers of graph convolution
layers for the classification. A two-layer GCN is commonly
used for semi-supervised node classification tasks [Kipf and
Welling, 2017]. The model can, therefore, be described as:
Z = f(X,A) = softmax(Aˆσ(AˆXW (0))W (1)) (2)
where Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 . Aˆ is essentially the symmetri-
cally normalized adjacency matrix. W (0) and W (1) are the
input-to-hidden and hidden-to-output weights, respectively.
2.2 Gradients Based Adversarial Attacks
Gradients are commonly exploited to attack deep learning
models [Yuan et al., 2019]. One can either use the gradi-
ents of the loss function or the gradients of the model out-
put w.r.t the input data to achieve the attacks. Two examples
are Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack and Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) attack. Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [Ian J. Goodfellow, 2014] generates
adversarial examples by performing gradient update along the
direction of the sign of gradients of loss function w.r.t each
pixel for image data. Their perturbation can be expressed as:
η = sign(∇Jθ(x, l)) (3)
where  is the magnitude of the perturbation. The gener-
ated example is x
′
= x+ η.
JSMA attack was first proposed in [Papernot et al., 2016].
By exploiting the forward derivative of a DNN model, one
can find the adversarial perturbations that force the model to
misclassify the test point into a specific target class. Given a
feed-forward neural network F and sample X, the Jacobian
is computed by:
∇F (X) = ∂F (X)
∂X
=
[
∂Fj(X)
∂xi
]
i∈1...M,j∈1...N
(4)
where the dimensions for the model output and input data
are M and N , respectively. To achieve a target class t, one
wants Ft(X) gets increased while Fj(X) for all the other
j 6= t to decrease. This is accomplished by exploiting the
adversarial saliency map which is defined by:
S(X, t)[i] =
{
0, if ∂Ft(X)∂Xi < 0 or Σj 6=t
∂Fj(X)
∂Xi
> 0
∂Ft(X)
∂Xi
|Σj 6=t ∂Fj(X)∂Xi |, otherwise
}
(5)
Starting from a normal example, the attacker follows the
saliency map and iteratively perturb the example with a very
tiny amount until the predicted label is flipped. For untar-
geted attack, one tries to minimize the prediction score for
the winning class.
2.3 Defense for Adversarial Examples
Although adversarial attack for a graph is a relatively new
topic, a few works have been done as the defense for adver-
sarial images on convolutional neural networks (e.g., [Xu
et al., 2018; Papernot and McDaniel, 2018]). For images,
as the feature space is continuous, adversarial examples are
carefully crafted with little perturbations. Therefore, in some
cases, adding some randomization to the images is able to
defend the attacks [Xie et al., 2018]. Other forms of input
pre-processing, such as local smoothing [Xu et al., 2018] and
image compression [Shaham et al., 2018] have also been used
to defend the attacks. These pre-processing works based on
the observation that neighboring pixels of natural images are
normally similar. Adversarial training [Trame`r et al., 2018]
introduces the generated examples to the training data to en-
hance the robustness of the model.
3 Integrated Gradients Guided Attack
Although FGSM and JSMA are not the most sophisticated
attack techniques, they are still not well-studied for graph
models. For image data, the success of FGSM and JSMA
benefits from the continuous features in pixel color space.
However, recent explorations in the graph adversarial attack
techniques [Zu¨gner et al., 2018; Dai et al., 2018] show that
simply applying these methods may not lead to successful
attacks. These work address this problem by either using
greedy methods or reinforcement learning based methods
which are often expensive.
The node features in a graph are often bag-of-words kind
of features which can either be 1 or 0. The unweighted edges
in a graph are also frequently used to express the existence
of specific relationships, thus having only 1 or 0 in the ad-
jacency matrix. When attacking the model, the adversarial
perturbations are limited to either changing 1 to 0 or vice
versa. The main issue of applying vanilla FGSM and JSMA
in graph models is the inaccurate gradients. Given a target
node t, for FGSM attack, ∇JW (1),W (2)(t) =
∂J
W (1),W (2)
(t)
∂X
measures the feature importance of all nodes to the loss func-
tion value. Here, X is the feature matrix, each row of which
describes the features for a node in the graph. For a specific
feature i of node n, a larger value of∇JW (1),W (2) in indicates
perturbing feature i to 1 is helpful to get the target node mis-
classified. However, following this gradient may not help for
two reasons: First, the feature value might already be 1 so that
we could not perturb it anymore; Second, even if the feature
value is 0, since a GCN model may not learn a local linear
function between 0 and 1 for this feature value, the result of
this perturbation is unpredictable. It is also similar for JSMA
as the Jacobian of the model shares all the limitations with
the gradients of loss. In other words, vanilla gradients suffer
from local gradient problems. Take a simple ReLU network
f(x) = ReLU(x) as an example, when x increase from 0 to
1, the function value also increases by 1. However, comput-
ing the gradient at x = 0 gives 0, which does not capture the
model behaviors accurately. To address this, we propose an
integrated gradients based method rather than directly using
vanilla derivatives for the attacks. Integrated gradients were
initially proposed by [Sundararajan et al., 2017] to provide
sensitivity and implementation invariance for feature attribu-
tion in the deep neural networks, particularly the convolu-
tional neural networks for images.
The integrated gradient is defined as follows: for a given
model F : Rn → [0, 1], let x ∈ Rn be the input, x′ is the
baseline input (e.g., the black image for image data). Con-
sider a straight-line path from x
′
to the input x, the integrated
gradients are obtained by accumulating all the gradients at all
the points along the path. Formally, for the ith feature of x,
the integrated gradients (IG) is as follows:
IGi(F (x)) ::= (xi − x
′
i)×
∫ 1
α=0
∂F (x
′
+ αx(x− x′))
∂xi
dα (6)
For GCN on graph data, we propose a generic attack frame-
work. Given the adjacency matrix A, feature matrix X , and
the target node t, we compute the integrated gradients for
function FW (1),W (2)(A,X, t) w.r.t I where I is the input for
attack. I = A indicates edge attacks while I = X indi-
cates feature attacks. When F is the loss function of the
GCN model, we call this attack technique FGSM-like attack
with integrated gradients, namely IG-FGSM. Similarly, we
call the attack technique by IG-JSMA when F is the predic-
tion output of the GCN model. For a targeted IG-JSMA or
IG-FGSM attack, the optimization goal is to maximize the
value of F . Therefore, for the features or edges having the
value of 1, we select the features/edges which have the low-
est negative IG scores and perturb them to 0. The untargeted
IG-JSMA attack aims to minimize the prediction score for the
winning class so that we try to increase the input dimensions
with high IG scores to 0.
Note that unlike image feature attribution where the base-
line input is the black image, we use the all-zero or all-one
feature/adjacency matrices to represent the 1 → 0 or 0 → 1
perturbations. While removing a specific edge or setting a
specific feature from 1 to 0, we set the adjacency matrix A
and feature matrix X to all-zero respectively since we want
to describe the overall change pattern of the target function
F while gradually adding edges/features to the current state
ofA andX. On the contrary, to add edges/features, we com-
pute the change pattern by gradually removing edges/features
from all-one to the current state, thus setting eitherA orX to
an all-one matrix. To keep the direction of gradients consis-
tent and ensure the computation is tractable, the IG (for edge
attack) is computed as follows:
IG(F (X,A, t))[i, j] ≈

(Aij − 0)× Σmk=1
∂F ( k
m
×(Aij−0))
∂Aij
× 1m ,
for removing edges
(1− Aij)× Σmk=1
∂F ( k
m
×(1−Aij))
∂Aij
× 1m ,
for adding edges
(7)
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for untargeted IG-
JSMA attack. We compute the integrated gradients of the
prediction score for winning class c w.r.t the entries of A and
X . The integrated gradients are then used as metrics to mea-
sure the priority of perturbing specific features or edges in the
graphG. Note that the edge and feature values are considered
and only the scores of possible perturbations are computed
(see Eq.(7)). For example, we only compute the importance
of adding edges if the edge does not exist before. Therefore,
for a feature or an edge with high perturbation priority, we
perturb it by simply flipping it to a different binary value.
While setting the number of steps m for computing inte-
grated gradients, one size does not fit all. Essentially, more
steps are required to accurately estimate the discrete gradi-
ents when the function learned for certain features/edges is
non-linear. Therefore, we enlarge the number of steps while
attacking the nodes with low classification margins until sta-
ble performance is achieved. Moreover, the calculation can
be done in an incremental way if we increase the number of
steps by integer multiples.
To ensure the perturbations are unnoticeable, the graph
structure and feature statistics should be preserved for edge
attack and feature attack, respectively. The specific prop-
erties to preserve highly depend on the application require-
ments. For our IG based attacks, we simply check against
these application-level requirements while selecting an edge
or a feature for perturbation. In practice, this process can be
trivial as many statistics can be pre-computed or re-computed
incrementally [Zu¨gner et al., 2018].
Algorithm 1: IG-JSMA - Integrated Gradient Guided un-
targeted JSMA attack on GCN
Input: Graph G(0) = (A(0), X(0)), target node v0
F : the GCN model trained on G(0)
budget ∆: the maximum number of perturbations.
Output: Modified graph G
′
= (A
′
, X
′
).
1 Procedure Attack()
2 //compute the gradients as the perturbation scores for
edges and features.
3 se← calculate edge importance(A)
4 sf ← calculate feature importance(X)
5 //sort nodes and edges according to their scores.
6 features← sort by importance(s f)
7 edges← sort by importance(s e)
8 f← features.first, e← edges.first
9 while |A′ −A|+ |X ′ −X| < ∆ do
10 //decide which to perturb
11 if se[e] > sf [f ] then
12 flip feature f
13 f← f.next
14 else
15 flip edge e
16 e =← e.next
17 end
18 end
19 return G′
4 Defense for Adversarial Graph
In order to defend the adversarial targeted attacks on GCNs,
we first hypothesize that the GCNs are easily attacked due
to the fact that the GCN models strongly rely on the graph
structure and local aggregations. The model trained on the
attacked graph therefore suffers from the attack surface of the
model crafted by the adversarial graph. As it is well known
that adversarial attacks on deep learning systems are trans-
ferable to models with similar architecture and trained on the
same dataset. Existing attacks on GCN models are success-
ful as the attacked graphs are directly used to train the new
model. Given that, one feasible defense is to make the adja-
cency matrix trainable. If the edge weights are learned dur-
ing the training process, they may evolve so that the graph
becomes different compared with the graph crafted by the ad-
versary.
We then verify this idea by making the edge weights train-
able in GCN models. In CORA-ML dataset, we select a node
that is correctly classified and has the highest prediction score
for its ground-truth class. The adversarial graph was con-
structed by using nettack [Zu¨gner et al., 2018]. Without any
defense, the target node is misclassified with the confidence
of 0.998 after the attack. Our defense initializes the weights
of the edges just as the adversarial graph. We then train the
GCN model without making any additional modifications on
the loss functions or other parameters of the model. Inter-
estingly, with such a simple defense method, the target node
is correctly classified with high confidence (0.912) after the
attack.
To explain why the defense works, we observe following
the characteristics of the attacks: First, perturbing edges is
more effective than modifying the features. This is consis-
tent in all the attacks (i.e., FGSM, JSMA, nettack, and IG-
JSMA). Feature-only perturbations generally fail to change
the predicted class of the target node. Moreover, the attack
approaches tend to favour adding edges over removing edges;
Second, nodes with more neighbors are more difficult to at-
tack than those with less neighbors. This is also consistent
with the observations in [Zu¨gner et al., 2018] that nodes with
higher degrees have higher classification accuracy in both the
clean and the attacked graphs.
Last, the attacks tend to connect the target node to nodes
with different features and labels. We find out that this is the
most powerful way to perform attacks. We verify this obser-
vation using CORA-ML dataset. To measure the similarity
of the features, we use the Jaccard similarity score since the
features of CORA-ML dataset are bag-of-words. Note that
our defense mechanism is generic, while the similarity mea-
sures may vary among different datasets. For the graphs with
other types of features, such as numeric features, we may use
different similarity measures. Given two nodes u and v with
n binary features, the Jaccard similarity score measures the
overlap that u and v share with their features. Each feature of
u and v can either be 0 or 1. The total number of each com-
bination of features for both u and v are specified as follows:
M11 is the number of features where both u and v have a
value of 1. M01 is the feature number where the value of the
feature is 0 in node u but 1 in node v. Similarly, M10 is the
total number of features which have a value of 1 in node u
but 0 in node v. M00 represents the total number of features
which are 0 for both nodes. The Jaccard similarity score is
given as
Ju,v =
M11
M01 +M10 +M11
. (8)
We train a two-layer GCN on the CORA-ML dataset and
study the nodes that are classified correctly with high prob-
ability (i.e., ≥ 0.8). For these nodes, Figure 1 shows the
histograms for the Jaccard similarity scores between con-
nected nodes before and after the FGSM attack. The adver-
sarial attack significantly increases the number of neighbors
which have low similarity scores to the target nodes. This
also stands for nettack [Zu¨gner et al., 2018]. For example,
we enable both feature and edge attacks for nettack and at-
tack the node 200 in the GCN model trained on CORA-ML
dataset. Given the node degree of 3, the attack removes the
edge 200→ 1582 because node 1582 and node 200 are simi-
lar (J1582,200 = 0.113). Meanwhile, the attacks add edge 200
→ 1762 and 200→ 350, and node 200 shares no feature sim-
ilarity with the two nodes. No features were perturbed in this
experiment.
This result explains our observations. Compared with deep
convolutional neural networks (for image data) which have
often more layers and parameters than graph neural networks.
GNNs, such as GCN for node classifications, are relatively
simple. They essentially aggregate the features according to
the graph structure. For a target node, an adversarially crafted
graph attempts to connect the nodes with different features
and labels to pollute the representation of the target node
to make the target node less similar to the nodes within its
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Figure 1: Histograms for the Jaccard similarities between connected
nodes before and after FGSM attack.
correct class. Correspondingly, while removing edges, the
attack tends to remove the edges connecting the nodes that
share many similarities to the target node. The edge attacks
are more effective due to the fact that adding or removing
one edge affects all the feature dimensions during the aggre-
gation. In contrast, modifying one feature only affects one
dimension in the feature vector and the perturbation can be
easily masked by other neighbors of nodes with high degrees.
Based on these observations, we make another hypothesis
that the above defense approach works because the model as-
signs lower weights to the edges that connect the target node
to the nodes sharing little feature similarity with it. To verify
this, we plot the learned weights and the Jaccard similarity
scores of the end nodes for the edges starting from the target
node (see Figure 2). Note that for the target node we choose,
the Jaccard similarity scores between every neighbor of the
target node and itself are larger than 0 in the clean graph. The
edges with zero similarity scores are all added by the attack.
As expected, the model learns low weights for most of the
edges with low similarity scores.
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Figure 2: The normalized learned edge weights and the Jaccard sim-
ilarity scores for the end nodes of the edges. Each value of the x-axis
represents an edge in the neighborhood of the target node.
To make the defense more efficient, we do not even need to
use learnable edge weights as the defense. Learning the edge
weights inevitably introduces extra parameters to the model,
which may affect the its scalability and accuracy. A simple
approach is potentially as effective based on the following:
First, normal nodes generally do not connect to many nodes
that share no similarities with it; Second, the learning process
essentially assigns low weights to the edges connecting two
dissimilar nodes. We therefore propose a simple yet effective
defense approach based on the following insight.
Our defense approach is pre-processing based. We perform
a pre-processing on a given graph before training. We check
the adjacency matrix of the graph and inspect the edges. All
the edges that connect nodes with low similarity score (e.g.,
= 0) are selected as candidates to remove. Although the clean
graph may also have a small number of such edges, we find
that removing these edges does little harm to the prediction of
the target node. On the contrary, the removal of these edges
may improve the prediction in some cases. This is intuitive
as aggregating features from nodes that differ sharply from
the target often over-smooths the node representations. In
fact, a recent study [Wu et al., 2019] shows that the nonlin-
earity and multiple weight matrices at different layers do not
contribute much to the predictive capabilities of GCN models
but introduce unnecessary complexity. [Zu¨gner et al., 2018]
uses a simplified surrogate model to achieve the attacks on
GCN models for the same reason. Dai et al. [Dai et al., 2018]
briefly introduces a defense method by dropping some edges
during the training. They show this decreases the attack rate
slightly. In fact, their method works only when the edges con-
necting dissimilar nodes are removed. However, this defense
fails to differentiate the useful edges from those need to be
removed, thus achieving sub-optimal defense performance.
The proposed defense is computationally efficient as it only
makes one pass to the existing edges in the graph, thus having
the complexity ofO(N) whereN is the number of edges. For
large graphs, calculating the similarity scores can be easily
parallelized in implementation.
5 Evaluation
We use the widely used CORA-ML, CITESEER [Bojchevski
and Gu¨nnemann, 2018] and Polblogs [Adamic and Glance,
2005] datasets. The overview of the datasets is listed below.
Table 1: Statistics of the datasets.
Dataset Nodes Features Edges
CORA-ML 2708 1433 5429
Citeseer 3327 3703 4732
Polblogs 1490 - 19025
We split each graph in labeled (20%) and unlabeled nodes
(80%). Among the labeled nodes, half of them is used for
training while the rest half is used for validation. For the
polblogs dataset, since there are no feature attributes, we set
the attribute matrix to an identity matrix.
5.1 Transductive Attack
As mentioned, due to the transductive setting, the models are
not regarded as fixed while attacking. After perturbing either
features or edges, the model is retrained for evaluating the at-
tack effectiveness. To verify the effectiveness of the attack,
we select the nodes with different prediction scores. Specifi-
cally, we select in total 40 nodes which contain the 10 nodes
with top scores, 10 nodes with the lowest scores and 20 ran-
domly selected nodes. We compare the proposed IG-JSMA
with several baselines including random attacks, FGSM, and
nettack. Note that for the baselines, we conducted direct at-
tacks on the features of the target node or the edges directly
connected to the target node. Direct attacks achieve much
better attacks so that can act as stronger baselines.
To evaluate how effective is the attack, we use classifica-
tion margins as the metric. For a target node v, the classi-
fication margin of v is Zv,c − maxc′ 6=cZv,c′ where c is the
ground truth class, Zv,c is the probability of class c given to
the node v by the graph model. A lower classification mar-
gin indicates better attack performance. Figure 3 shows the
classification margins of nodes after re-training the model on
the modified graph. We found that IG-JSMA outperforms the
baselines. More remarkably, IG-JSMA is quite stable as the
classification margins have much less variance. Just as stated
in [Zu¨gner et al., 2018], the vanilla gradient-based methods,
such as FGSM are not able to capture the actual change of
loss for discrete data. Similarly, while used to describe the
saliency map, the vanilla gradients are also not accurate.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of IG-JSMA, we also
compare it with the original JSMA method where the saliency
map is computed by the vanilla gradients. Table 2 compares
the ratio of correctly classified nodes after the JSMA and IG-
JSMA attacks for 100 random sampled nodes, respectively.
A lower value is better as more nodes are misclassified. We
can see that IG-JSMA outperforms JSMA attack. This shows
that the saliency map given by integrated gradients approxi-
mate the change patterns of the discrete features/edges better.
Table 2: The ratio of correctly classified nodes under JSMA and
IG-JSMA attacks.
Dataset CORA Citeseer Polblogs
JSMA 0.04 0.06 0.04
IG JSMA 0.00 0.01 0.01
Figure 4 gives an intuitive example about this. For the
graph, we conducted evasion attack where the parameters of
the model are kept fixed as the clean graph. For a target node
in the graph, given a two-layer GCN model, the prediction
of the target node only relies on its two-hop ego graph. We
define the importance of a feature/an edge as follows: For
a target node v, The brute-force method to measure the im-
portance of the nodes and edges is to remove one node or one
edge at a time in the graph and check the change of prediction
score of the target node.
Assume the prediction score for the winning class c is pc.
After setting entry Aij of the adjacency matrix from 1 to 0,
the pc changes to p
′
c. We define the importance of the edge
by ∆pc = p
′
c − pc. To measure the importance of a node, we
could simply remove all the edges connected to the node and
see how the prediction scores change. The importance values
can be regarded as the ground truth discrete gradients.
Both vanilla gradients and integrated gradients are approx-
imations of the ground truth importance scores. The node
importance can be approximated by the sum of the gradients
of the prediction score w.r.t all the features of the node as well
as the gradients w.r.t to the entries of the adjacency matrix.
In Figure 4, the node color represents the class of the node.
Round nodes indicate positive importance scores while dia-
mond nodes indicate negative importance score. The node
size indicates the value of the positive/negative importance
score. A larger node means higher importance. Similarly, red
edges are the edges which have positive importance scores
while blue ones have negative importance scores. Thicker
edges correspond to more important edges in the graph and
the pentagram represents the target node in the attack.
Figure 4a, 4b and 4c show the node importance results
of brute-force, vanilla gradients and integrated gradients ap-
proach respectively (# of steps = 20). The vanilla gradients re-
veal little information about node/edge importance as almost
all the edges are assigned with certain importance scores and
it is difficult to see the actual node/edge influence. However,
in the brute-force case, we notice that the majority number of
edges are considered not important for the target node. More-
over, vanilla gradients underestimate the importance of nodes
overall. The integrated gradients, as shown in Figure 4c is
consistent with the ground truth produced by brute-force ap-
proach shown in Figure 4a. With only 20 steps along the path,
integrated gradients provide accurate approximations for the
importance scores. This shows the integrated gradients ap-
proach is effective when used to guide the adversarial attacks
on graphs with discrete values.
5.2 Defense
In the following, we study the effectiveness of the pro-
posed defense technique under different settings. We use
the CORA-ML and Citeseer datasets that have features for
the nodes. We first evaluate whether the proposed defense
method affects the performance of the model. Table 4 shows
the accuracy of the GCN models with/without the defense.
Table 3: Accuracy (%) of models on clean data with/without the
proposed defense. We remove the outliers (i.e., accu ≤ 75%/65%
for CORA-ML/Citeseer) due to the high variance.
Dataset w/o defensde w/ defense
CORA-ML 80.9± 0.6 80.7± 0.7
Citeseer 69.5± 0.7 69.6± 0.8
We find that the proposed defense was cheap to use as the
pre-processing of our defense method almost makes no neg-
ative impact on the performance of the GCN models. More-
over, the time overhead is negligible. Enabling defense on
the GCNs models for the two datasets increases the run time
of training by only 7.52s and 3.79s, respectively. Note that
run time results are obtained using our non-optimized Python
implementation.
For different attacks, we then evaluate how the classifi-
cation margins and accuracy of the attacked nodes change
with/without the defense. As in the experiments of trans-
ductive attack, we select 40 nodes with different prediction
scores. The statistics of the selected nodes are the follow-
ings: For CORA-ML and Citeseers datasets, we train the
GCN models on the clean graphs. The selected nodes have
classification margins of 0.693 ± 0.340 and 0.636 ± 0.419,
respectively.
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Figure 3: The classification margin under different attack techniques.
(a) Ground Truth (b) Vanilla Gradients (c) Integrated Gradients
Figure 4: The approximations of node/edge importance.
Table 4: Classification margins and error rates (%) for the GCN
models with different attacks.
Dataset Attack CM (w/ attack) Accu (w/ attack)
w/ defense no defense w/ defense no defense
CORA
FGSM 0.299± 0.741 -0.833± 0.210 0.625 0.025
JSMA 0.419± 0.567 -0.828± 0.225 0.775 0
nettack 0.242± 0.728 -0.839± 0.343 0.600 0.025
IG-JSMA 0.397± 0.553 -0.897± 0.114 0.750 0
Citeseer
FGSM 0.451± 0.489 -0.777± 0.279 0.825 0.025
JSMA 0.501± 0.531 -0.806± 0.186 0.775 0.05
nettack 0.421± 0.468 -0.787± 0.332 0.775 0.025
IG-JSMA 0.495± 0.507 -0.876± 0.186 0.800 0.025
The results are given in Table 4. First of all, without de-
fenses, most of the selected nodes are misclassified as the ac-
curacy is always under 0.05 for any attacks. By enabling the
defense approach, the accuracy can be significantly improved
regardless of the attack methods. This, to some degree, shows
that all the attack methods seek similar edges to attack and the
proposed defense approach is attack-independent. Although
a few nodes were still misclassified with the defense, the pre-
diction confidence for their winning class is much lower since
the classification margins increase. Therefore, it becomes
harder to fool the users because manual checks are gener-
ally involved in predictions with low confidence. Overall, the
proposed defense is effective even though we only remove the
edges that connect nodes with Jaccard similarity score of 0.
6 Conclusions and Discussion
Graph neural networks (GNN) significantly improved the an-
alytic performance on many types of graph data. However,
like deep neural networks in other types of data, GNN suf-
fers from robustness problems. In this paper, we gave in-
sight into the robustness problem in graph convolutional net-
works (GCN). We proposed an integrated gradients based at-
tack method that outperformed existing iterative and gradient-
based techniques in terms of attack performance. We also an-
alyzed attacks on GCN and revealed the robustness issue was
rooted in the local aggregation in GCN. We give an effec-
tive defense method to improve the robustness of GCN mod-
els. We demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of our
methods on benchmark data.
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